Lt. Gen. Nitin Kohli on Information Warfare, Cyber Power, and India’s Multi-Domain Security

Lt. Gen. Nitin Kohli, PVSM, AVSM, VSM

[A distinguished Indian Army signals stalwart and former Signal Officer-in-Chief whose four-decade career spanning strategic communications, institutional transformation, and defence planning exemplifies visionary leadership in modern military affairs.]

 

Question: 

India faces simultaneous kinetic, cyber, and information threats. How should the Armed Forces build credible deterrence across domains while preventing escalation in a two-front and gray-zone environment?

Answer:

Deterrence today is less about building defensive walls and more about shaping consequences. The message to any adversary must be clear: aggression will invite a response that costs more than it gains. We are steadily moving from simply blocking threats to being prepared to impose real penalties when required. Recent operations have shown that precise, multi-domain capabilities can achieve political and military objectives without widening conflict.

In a two-front and gray-zone environment, balance is critical. We need clearly communicated red lines, strong and visible cyber capabilities, and highly resilient command and control systems. Nuclear communication networks, in particular, must be secure, redundant, and future-ready.

Gray-zone conflict often begins with ambiguity; a cyber intrusion, data manipulation, or system spoofing that can be misread. That is why depth, redundancy, and specialist cyber expertise matter. Cyber defence cannot be treated as a side function; it needs dedicated professionals with long-term focus.

Effective deterrence finally rests on two things: credible capability and disciplined control. We must be strong enough to respond; and steady enough to prevent escalation.

Question: 

With theaterization and joint operations advancing, what are the key challenges in integrating Signals, cyber, and electronic warfare assets across the three services to achieve real information superiority?

Answer:

Information superiority is not a slogan; it is what allows a force to see clearly and act faster than its opponent. Without it, even strong forces operate at a disadvantage. The biggest hurdle today is not technology alone, but integration. Our Signals, cyber, and electronic warfare assets still reflect service-based structures, while modern conflict demands a unified data-driven approach.

Joint theatre structures are designed to solve this, but organizational change always moves slower than technology. We need shared networks, interoperable systems, and clear authority lines. Strategic control should be centralized, but execution must stay flexible at the tactical level.

Automation projects and software-defined radios are already improving interoperability and reaction time. These reduce manual processes and give field commanders faster decision space.The Tri services defence communication networks are also in place nowadays.

The harder challenge is cultural. Silos must give way to mission-first integration. Technology can connect systems, but only leadership and institutional can connect organizations. Information dominance is achieved when people, processes, and platforms are aligned; not when they merely coexist.

Question: 

Non-kinetic and gray-zone operations are expanding rapidly. How critical is tight fusion between civilian digital infrastructure and military networks to protect India's strategic and operational depth?

Answer:

Civilian and military digital systems are now so interconnected that security cannot be separated between them. In gray-zone conflict, adversaries target exactly these junctions, power grids, telecom networks, data cables, and logistics platforms. Protecting them is not optional cooperation; it is national resilience.

Take undersea data cables; they carry almost all international digital traffic yet remain physically vulnerable. Their security now has both economic and military implications. That is why they must be treated as strategic assets, not just commercial infrastructure.

We are also seeing real value in civil–military collaboration programs that bring administrators, technologists, and soldiers into shared problem-solving spaces. Much frontier innovation;AI tools, analytics, simulation; is happening in the civilian sector. The armed forces must tap into that energy faster. We also need to increase our R&D budget to exploit indigenous talent and have self reliance.

The principle is simple: innovation often starts in civilian labs, but operationalization requires military insight. When both work together early, capability matures faster and safer.

National digital security is now a shared duty; government, military, and industry together; because disruption in one domain quickly spreads to all others. The civil military fusion in this regard is important.

Question: 

As AI, deepfakes, and cognitive warfare tools mature, how must military decision cycles, command systems, and information validation protocols evolve to stay ahead of adversaries?

Answer:

Modern conflict increasingly targets perception and judgment, not just territory. Cognitive warfare aims to confuse, divide, and delay decisions. AI-driven misinformation and deepfakes can move faster than traditional verification systems, which puts pressure on commanders and institutions alike.

Our decision cycles must therefore become both faster and smarter. Speed alone is not enough; accuracy and validation are equally important. A faster OODA loop is decisive in military victory. AI tools can help by cross-checking sources, detecting anomalies, and flagging manipulation before information reaches decision-makers.

New systems are being designed to support analysts rather than replace them; combining machine speed with human judgment. Verification layers, secure authentication, and traceable communication trails are becoming standard safeguards.

Training must also evolve. Officers now need awareness not just of terrain and firepower, but of information authenticity and narrative manipulation.

The core shift is this: earlier we managed information overload; now we must manage information trust. Winning in this space means ensuring that leaders act on verified reality, not engineered illusion.

Question: 

Under Atmanirbhar Bharat, what are the toughest barriers to building secure, tamper-proof indigenous military communication and network systems;and how can India overcome technology and supply-chain vulnerabilities?

Answer:

Self-reliance in defence technology is ultimately about security, not symbolism. The hardest challenges are time, scale, and trusted supply chains. Secure communications equipment depends on advanced chips, encryption, and hardware integrity; areas where global leaders have built decades-long advantages.

India is moving forward through semiconductor initiatives, startup ecosystems, and defence innovation programs, but transition from prototype to field deployment must become faster. Smaller firms are producing excellent niche technologies, yet procurement timelines often slow adoption.

Supply-chain resilience also means diversification and redundancy; never depending on a single external source for critical components. Standards-based indigenous systems are an encouraging step because they reduce hidden vulnerabilities.

We should view indigenisation as a long-term mission. Partnerships with trusted global players can accelerate progress, but sovereign capability must remain the anchor.

The objective is practical: ensure that no external dependency can disable our communications or compromise our networks. That is the true meaning of technological self-reliance in defence.

Seema Sanghosh English: February 2026