Bharat Is Losing West Asia; But It Is Not Too Late
-Siddharth Dave
For more than a decade, Bharat quietly built one of its most significant diplomatic successes in West Asia. New Delhi cultivated simultaneously close relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran, while deepening economic, energy, connectivity and people-to-people ties across the region. This was the essence of Indian strategic autonomy: engage everyone, join no camp and protect national interests.
That carefully constructed position is now facing its most serious test.
West Asia is undergoing a once-in-a-generation transformation. The old security architecture, in which the United States was the overwhelmingly dominant external guarantor, is under pressure. The wars involving Israel and Iran, attacks on Gulf states, instability around the Red Sea and uncertainty over American commitments have encouraged regional powers to develop their own security options.
The clearest symbol of this transition is the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. Its core provision states that an armed attack against one of the three countries shall be regarded as an attack against all. The agreement also envisages expanded defence cooperation.
For Bharat, this should not be viewed merely as another Middle Eastern diplomatic development. It should be treated as a strategic warning.
From Bharat's Decade of Gains to a New Regional Reality
Bharat's West Asia policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi produced remarkable results.
In 2016, Saudi Arabia conferred its highest civilian honour on Prime Minister Modi, reflecting the extraordinary improvement in bilateral relations. Bharat subsequently developed an increasingly strategic partnership with Riyadh, encompassing energy, investment, counter-terrorism and defence.
In 2021, Bharat joined the United States, Israel and the UAE in the I2U2 framework, creating a new platform for cooperation in food security, technology, investment and infrastructure.
In 2024, Bharat and Iran renewed Bharat's long-term strategic role at Chabahar, providing New Delhi with an important connectivity gateway towards Afghanistan and Central Asia.
These were not isolated diplomatic achievements. Together, they demonstrated that Bharat could maintain productive relationships with countries that themselves had deep disagreements.
But the regional environment that made this balancing act possible is changing.
The prolonged confrontation involving Israel, Iran and their respective partners has shaken assumptions about the durability of the existing order. Gulf states are reassessing their security dependence on Washington, while simultaneously seeking greater strategic room for manoeuvre. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Iran and other regional powers increasingly want to shape their own security environment rather than simply operate within an American-designed framework.
The result is a more fragmented but also more autonomous West Asia.
And Pakistan has understood this shift earlier than Bharat appears to have done.
Pakistan Is Back in the West Asian Game
For years, Pakistan's influence in West Asia appeared to be declining relative to Bharat's rapidly expanding diplomatic footprint.
That perception is changing.
Islamabad has retained its historic military relationship with Saudi Arabia and its increasingly close defence relationship with Türkiye. Pakistan's military establishment has also positioned itself as a useful interlocutor in the rapidly changing regional security environment.
The Makkah agreement brings these relationships into a new framework.
Saudi Arabia brings financial power, energy influence and enormous political and religious significance. Türkiye brings a substantial military-industrial base, NATO experience and rapidly expanding defence technology. Pakistan brings military manpower, operational experience and nuclear capability.
The combination is strategically significant even though it would be premature to describe the arrangement as a fully developed "Islamic NATO". The agreement's precise operational mechanisms and obligations remain less developed than those of NATO, and the three countries have different strategic priorities.
Yet dismissing it would be equally dangerous.
The most important feature of the pact is not whether Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan immediately form a military bloc. It is that three important regional powers have decided that their security cannot be left entirely to an external guarantor.
That is the trend Bharat must understand.
Why Should Bharat Be Concerned?
The pact is not formally directed against Bharat. Saudi Arabia itself has substantial and growing relations with New Delhi. Nor should Bharat assume that Riyadh would automatically support Pakistan in every Bharat-Pakistan confrontation.
But strategic consequences do not require an agreement to name Bharat as an adversary.
The first concern is Pakistan's enhanced diplomatic legitimacy.
Islamabad has moved from being primarily a South Asian security problem to becoming a participant in an emerging West Asian security architecture. That gives Pakistan additional diplomatic space, resources and defence relationships.
The second concern is Türkiye.
Ankara's defence-industrial cooperation with Pakistan has expanded substantially. Turkish military technology, including drones and other systems, can strengthen Pakistani capabilities. Recent Turkish military movements to Pakistan have also attracted scrutiny in Bharat.
The third concern is strategic spillover.
The geographical distance between South Asia and West Asia is deceptive. Bharat's energy supplies, remittances, maritime trade and diaspora connect the two regions intimately. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb are not merely Middle Eastern waterways; they are lifelines for Bharat's economy.
A conflict involving Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan can therefore acquire direct consequences for Bharat within hours.
And a future confrontation between Israel and Pakistan cannot be entirely dismissed. Given Bharat's deepening strategic relationship with Israel, New Delhi could find itself facing difficult diplomatic and security choices even when it has no interest in becoming a participant in the conflict.
The Bigger Problem Is Not the Mecca Pact
Bharat's real problem is not Pakistan's new diplomatic success.
It is the possibility that Bharat may become reactive while others become architects of the new regional order.
There is a temptation in New Delhi to assume that Israel, backed by the United States, will ultimately dominate the strategic equation. That assumption is dangerous.
American policy itself is undergoing political debate. Across the American political spectrum, questions are increasingly being raised about the costs and consequences of open-ended US commitments in West Asia.
Bharat therefore cannot outsource its West Asian strategy to the assumption that American power will indefinitely guarantee a regional balance favourable to Indian interests.
Nor can Bharat reduce West Asia to the Israel-Palestine question.
The region is much larger.
It includes Saudi Arabia and Iran; the UAE and Türkiye; Egypt and Jordan; the Red Sea and the Gulf; Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen; and the maritime routes connecting the Indian Ocean with Europe.
Bharat needs a West Asia policy that corresponds to this reality.
The Third Way: Strategic Activism Without Bloc Politics
Bharat does not need another alliance.
It needs a strategy.
The answer lies neither in passively accepting the emerging order nor in joining one of its competing blocs. Bharat should instead become an active provider of stability, connectivity, technology, training and diplomacy.
First, re-engage Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia should be at the centre of Bharat's West Asian strategy.
There is no fundamental strategic contradiction between New Delhi and Riyadh comparable to the disputes Saudi Arabia has with some other regional actors. Bharat's energy requirements, investments, technology partnerships, defence cooperation and diaspora create a natural foundation for a deeper strategic relationship.
Bharat should therefore intensify the political and security dialogue with Riyadh rather than view Saudi Arabia primarily through the prism of its relationship with Pakistan.
Second, encourage Arab-Iranian engagement
Bharat has a unique advantage here.
New Delhi maintains relations with both Iran and the Arab Gulf states. Rather than being forced to choose, Bharat can use its credibility with both sides to encourage practical confidence-building.
The UAE-Iran relationship could provide an initial platform.
Bharat need not become a mediator in every dispute. But it can become a trust-builder.
Third, strengthen Jordan
Jordan occupies a strategically vital position in the Levant and faces serious security pressures.
Bharat's growing capabilities in defensive technologies, surveillance, cybersecurity and counter-terrorism can provide useful avenues for cooperation.
Such partnerships would demonstrate that Bharat's contribution to West Asian security is not simply rhetorical.
Fourth, protect the maritime lifelines
Bharat's merchant shipping cannot depend upon diplomatic assurances alone.
The Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb and Red Sea are integral to Bharat's economic security.
New Delhi should deepen maritime coordination with Egypt and Gulf partners, expand naval cooperation and explore appropriate forms of sustained Indian presence in the western Indian Ocean and Red Sea region.
Possibilities for logistical and maritime cooperation with countries such as Somaliland or around Socotra should also be examined carefully, with due consideration for local sensitivities and international law.
Fifth, prepare for the future of UN peacekeeping
Lebanon will remain an important test of international commitment to regional stability. As the future of UNIFIL and other international mechanisms is debated, Bharat should be prepared to contribute meaningfully to any future UN-authorised peacekeeping or stabilisation arrangements.
Bharat has both the experience and credibility to do so.
Sixth, expand defence diplomacy
Bharat should offer more military training, staff exchanges, maritime exercises, counter-terrorism cooperation and humanitarian assistance to countries across West Asia.
Defence diplomacy should not be confined to Israel or a handful of Gulf partners.
Bharat should talk to everyone.
Finally, appoint a Special Envoy for West Asia
Bharat's interests in the region now extend far beyond the Israel-Palestine peace process.
Energy security, maritime security, diaspora protection, defence cooperation, connectivity, counter-terrorism, investment and great-power competition all intersect in West Asia.
A Special Envoy for West Asia, working across ministries and reporting directly to the highest political leadership, could provide the sustained coordination that the region increasingly demands.
Bharat Must Not Choose Sides; It Must Shape the Balance
The lesson of the Makkah pact is not that Bharat should panic.
Nor is it that Bharat should immediately construct a counter-alliance.
That would be precisely the wrong response.
Bharat's greatest strategic asset in West Asia has always been its ability to speak to different sides simultaneously. It has relations with Israel and Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Egypt and Jordan. It has economic interests everywhere and a vast Indian community spread across the Gulf.
This is an extraordinary diplomatic capital.
But diplomatic capital depreciates when it is not actively invested.
Bharat therefore needs to move from relationship management to regional strategy.
The emerging West Asian order will not be shaped only by Washington, Moscow or Beijing. Regional powers themselves are increasingly becoming architects of their security environment.
Saudi Arabia is hedging.
Türkiye is asserting itself.
Iran remains a major regional power.
Pakistan has found a new diplomatic opening.
The United States remains powerful but its role is being reassessed.
In this fluid environment, Bharat has two choices.
It can wait for the new order to settle and then adjust to it.
Or it can help shape the order itself.
For a country aspiring to be a leading power and a net security provider, the second option is the only credible one.
Bharat may be losing ground in West Asia; but it has not lost the region. The window for strategic correction remains open. What is required now is not another slogan, another bloc or another reactive diplomatic manoeuvre. What Bharat needs is sustained strategic activism: engage everyone, trust no bloc blindly, protect the maritime lifelines, deepen defence diplomacy and make Bharat's presence indispensable to the region's stability.
The time to act is before the new West Asian order hardens into structures that Bharat did not help create.
Seema Sanghosh English | September 2026
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